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advantageous, inasmuch as intent is a necessary element of criminal
assault at common law. In the absence of provisions of this nature
many negligent acts deserving punishment would go unpunished.
A statute, to the effect that "a jailer or other officer who negli-
gently suffers a prisoner in custody for a criminal offense to escape"
may be punished, is found in thirteen states." Twenty-two states have
statutes similar to that of Michigan stating thar one who "negligently
sets fire to the woods or grounds of another" may be punished. 2
Nevada punishes one who negligently leaves a campfire burning.1
3
Mississippi punishes one who carelessly places tacks on the highways."'
A summary of this nature points out the fact that criminal negli-
gence forms an important part of statutory criminal law. By observ-
ing the various types of statutes, we are able to discern which of them
are more advantageous. It is significant that Kentucky stands almost
alone in failing to make any statutory provision for criminal
negligence. SA MMMM.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-STATUTORY REGULATION.
(1I.)
A New York statute' declares that
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justi-
fiable, is murder in the first degree, when committed: ...
"2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing
a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a
premeditated design to effect the death of any individual ... "
7'Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 133, Sec. 15; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns,
1926) Sec. 10-1806; Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) Sec. 7536; Wis. Stat.
(1929) Sec. 346.36; W. Va. Code (1913) c. 61, Art. 5, Sec. 9; R. I. Gen.
Laws (1923) Sec. 5998; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1930) Sec. 4506; Vt.
Gen. Laws (1917) Sec. 8672; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) Sec. 7839;
Ore. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 14-422; Ohio Ann. Code (1934) Sec. 2480;
N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1927) Sec. 4405; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926)
c. 394, Sec. 15.
7 2 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) Sec. 16942; Idaho Comp. Stat. (1919)
Sec. 17-2722; Colo. Ann. Stat. (Mills, 1930) Sec. 2011; Ariz. Code
(Struckmeyer, 1928) Sec. 4695, 4696; Ala. Code (Michie, 1928) Sec.
4112, 4113; W. Va. Code (1913) c. 61, Art. 3, Sec. 9; Code of Wash.
(Pierce, 1929) Sec. 8444; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1930) Sec. 4435;
Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) Sec. 103-22-1, 103-22-2; S. D. Comp. Laws
(1929) Sec. 3983; S. C. Code (1922) Sec. 1208; Ore. Code Ann. (1930)
Sec. 14-363; Mont. Rev. Stat. (Choate, 1921, Supp. 1925) Sec. 11501:
Ohio Ann. Code (1934) Sec. 12436; N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1927)
Sec. 4310; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) Sec. 9775; N. Y. Consol-
idated Laws (Cahill, 1930) Sec. 1900; N. M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright,
1929) Sec. 35-1406; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) Sec. 10262;
N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 391, Sec. 5; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) Sec.
28-509.
13 Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) Sec. 10317.
"' Miss. Code Ann. (1930) Sec. 984,
IN. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1044.
STUDENT NomS
This statute, dispensing as it does with actual criminal intent,
and substituting therefor reckless and wanton misconduct, a type of
criminal negligence, in so serious a crime as first degree murder, sug-
gests a study of the statutory criminal law of the various American
jurisdictions2 with the object of determining to what extent criminal
negligence as a type of intent has been recognized by statute.
For the sake of convenience the statutes dealing with criminal
neogligence may be divided into several broad and general classes.
There are statutes concerned with criminal negligence generally, stat-
utes dealing with negligent homicides, statutes on other negligent
offenses against the person less than homicide, statutes on negligent
offenses against property, on negligent offenses against the public
safety, and on negligent offenses against public justice.
Statutes of a general nature either define criminal negligence, or
recognize it as an element of criminal offenses generally. A New
York statute' provides that
"Each of the terms 'neglect', 'negligence', 'negligent', and 'neg-
ligently' imports a want of such attention to the nature or prob-
able consequences of the act or omission as a prudent man ordi-
narily bestows in acting in his own concerns."
This section is part of a series of definitions of terms employed in the
penal law of New York. Statutes defining criminal negligence in
terms identical with those of the New York statute exist in Idaho,'
Montana,s Nevada, North Dakota,' Oklahoma,8 Oregon,9 and South
Dakota."'
An Arizona statuteu enacts that
"In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or
joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence."
Substantially identical statutes have been enacted in Idaho,' Mon-
tana," and Nevada. 4
Turning from these statutes of general nature to statutes dealing
with negligent homicide, we find provisions similar to those of the
New York statute quoted in the first paragraph of this note in the
"Except Delaware and New Jersey, the statutes of which were un-
fortunately unavailable.
'N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 3.
4Idaho Code (1932) § 17-101.
' Mont. Rev. Code (1921) § 10713.
,,Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 9978.
IN. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 10358.
'Okla. Stat. (1931) § 1783.
'Ore. Code (1930) § 14-1028.
11 S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 3626.
"Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) § 4486.
"Idaho Code (1932) § 17-114.
"MAont. Rev. Code (1921) § 10726.
" Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 9955.
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states of Alabama," Colorado,"1 Utah,"T and Washington." The same
statutory offense in Florida, 9 Oregon,- and Wisconsin" is murder in
the second degree, and in Mississippi, - North Dakota, 3 Oklahoma,
2
and South Dakota," the crime is simply murder, as degrees of murder
do not exist.
Illustrative of the situations comprised by the terms of this
statute is the case of Washington v. State."' The defendant fired
through a window into a room in which were four persons, intending
"to scare them". One of these persons was killed. The trial court
refused to instruct that if defendant did not intend to kill or shoot
at any of the occupants of the room, but merely intended to frighten
them, he was guilty of no higher offense than second degree man-
slaughter. On appeal, the supreme court of Alabama held that the
instruction requested would have been likely to mislead the jury by
withdrawing from their consideration the recklessness of the act, as
showing a depraved mind regardless of human life, which might make
the offense murder in the first degree.
In the case of State v. Massey the court held that one who know-
ingly, and with a reckless disregard of human life, drove an auto-
mobile occupied by several persons full speed into a train so that the
death of another resulted was guilty of murder under this statute.
Statutes dealing with negligent homicide amounting to man-
slaughter are numerous. Homicide "in the commission of a lawful
act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without
due caution or circumspection" is manslaughter in Arizona,2" Idaho,"
Illinois,- Montana," New Mexico, 2 Utah," and the territories of the
United States." In Arkansas," California," Georgia,-' Nevada," and
Oregon" the act need not be one "which might produce death."
"Ala. Code (1923) § 4454.
" Colo. Ann. Stat. (Mills, 1927) § 1753.
"7Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) § 103-28-3.
1Wash. Code (Pierce, 1929) § 8997.
1F la. Comp. Laws (1927) § 7137.
-*Ore. Code (1930) § 14-203.
"Wis. Stat. (1933) § 340.03.
"Miss. Code (1930) § 985.
2N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 9462.
2- Okla. Stat. (1931) § 2216.
S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4012.
660 Ala. 10 (1877).
" 20 Ala. App. 56, 100 So. 625 (1924).
2Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) § 4586.
"Idaho Code (1932) § 17-1106.
"Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935) c. 38, § 342.
"Mont. Rev. Code (1921) § 10959.
32N. M. Stat. (1929) § 35-305.
-"Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) § 103-28-5.
"U. S. C. A., Title 18, § 453.
"Ark. Dig. Stat. (1921) § 2356.
"Cal. Penal Code (1931) § 192.
"Ga. Ann. Code (Park, 1914) Vol. VI, § 64.
8Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 10069.
9Ore. Code (1930) § 14-206.
STUDENT NOTES
What Is "due caution"? In an Oregon case" the trial court ruled
that the jury must find the defendant guilty of "gross negligence" to
convict him of involuntary manslaughter under this statute. Said the
supreme court, "In this instruction the court not only guarded the
rights of the defendant, but went further in that direction than the
law warrants. 'Due caution' is that care which an ordinarily prudent
man would exercise under the circumstances, and the want of that
care is negligence without any qualifying terms..."
Another type of negligent manslaughter statute is that well rep-
resented by the Missouri law:"
"Every killing of a human being by the act, procurement or
culpable negligence of another, not herein declared to be murder
or excusable or justifiable homicide, shall be deemed man-
slaughter."
This statute phrased in substantially identical terms is also found
In Florida," Minnesota," Mississippi," New Hampshire, New York,4
North Dakota," Oklahoma," and South Dakota." Kansas has a similar
statute," but the homicide must be one which would have been man-
slaughter at common law.
What is "culpable negligence" within the meeting of this statute?
In a Missouri case' the court said
"The definition of culpable negligence heretofore approved in
State v. Weisman and other cases is mere negligence, such as
would be actionable in a civil suit, whereby life or limb is directly
endangered. Culpable negligence as used in our statute . ..means
something more than this. ... Before a person may be convicted of
manslaughter by culpable negligence under our statute, not only
must death have ensued from the negligent act or omission of such
person, but there must be facts and circumstances in evidence
tending to prove that such person was actuated at the time by a
reckless disregard of the consequences of his act, from which the
jury may reasonably infer the criminal intent so necessary to
guilt in every lawful conviction for violation of our criminal
statutes."
In an Oklahoma case2 in which the defendant was prosecuted
under this statute for homicide resulting from his negligent opera-
tion of an automobile, "culpable negligence" was defined as "the
+, State v. Clark, 99 Ore. 629, 196 Pac. 360 (1921).
'
11Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) § 3988.
-Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) §7141.
"M1inn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 10078.
"Miss. Code (1930) § 1003.
5N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 392, § 9.
1,3N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1052.
I
TN. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 9491.
"Okla. Stat. (1931) § 2228.
S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4024.
Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 21-420.
61 State v. Millin, 318 Mo. 553, 300 S. W. 694 (1927).
2Nail v. State, -Okla. Cr.-, 242 Pac. 270 (1925).
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omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent man would
do, or the doing of something which such a man would not do, under
the circumstances surrounding the particular case." The court said
further that there was a difference only of degree between mere
negligence and culpable negligence, and quoted with approval a state-
ment to the effect that "the same negligence, as it affects the indi-
vidual and the state, is, respectively, gross negligence and criminal
negligence." The defendant's culpability, said the court, was a ques-
tion of fact for the jury, and the test in such a case is the question,
"Do the acts charged as criminal show a degree of carelessness
amounting to a culpable disregard of the rights and safety of others?"
In Wisconsin the corresponding statutei identical in other re-
spects with that of Missouri, requires, not "culpable negligence", but
"gross negligence." In State v. Whateym the court characterized the
"gross negligence" requisite to the crime as of "more reprehensible
character than mere inadvertence or want or ordinary care. .. [There
must be] either a wilful intent to injure, or that reckless and wanton
disregard of the rights and safety of another or his property, which
the law deems equivalent to an intent to injure."
The Wyoming manslaughter statute5 requires "culpable neglect
or great carelessness." This provision was construed in State v.
McComb' to require that the negligence "must be more than ordinary
negligence, and must be culpable or criminal in its nature.. . And
carelessness by reason of driving at a speed that is unreasonable or Is
such as is likely to endanger life or limb is not necessarily criminal
carelessness within the meaning of our statute providing for punish-
ment for manslaughter."
By a Wisconsin statuter- involuntary homicide by the "culpable
negligence" of one who is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, a crime less than felony, is manslaughter in the first de-
gree. A similar statute exists in Kansas.5
Homicide by the culpable negligence of one who is engaged in
the commission of a trespass, or other injury to private rights, is
punished as third degree manslaughter by another Wisconsin statute.
6'
Similar statutes exist in KansasO and Mississippi.,
If the owner of a dangerous animal, knowing of its propensities,
keeps it without "ordinary care", the killing of any person by such
animal renders its owner guilty of manslaughter, by the terms of a
0Wis. Stat. (1933) § 340.26.
210 Wis. 157, 245 N. W. 93, 99 A. L. R. 749 (1932).
Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931) § 32-205.
S33 Wyo. 346, 239 Pac. 526, 41 A. L. R. 717 (1925).
';Wis. Stat. (1933) § 340.10.
,Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 21-407.
WWis. Stat. (1933) § 340.19.
3 Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 21-414.
"Miss. Code (1930) § 997.
STUDENT NoTEs 83
statute found in Florida,2 Kansas," Minnesota," Mississippi," Mis-
souri, 1 South Dakota," and Washington.68
If any person navigating any vessel for hire negligently overloads
such vessel so that it sinks and any person is drowned or otherwise
killed thereby, he is guilty of manslaughter, according to statutes in
Arkansas,49 Florida," Kansas,7' Minnesota,72 Mississippi," Nevada," New
York,7 ' North Dakota,-, Oklahoma," South Dakota,-"s Washington,"
and Wisconsin. 10
One having charge or control of a steamboat, who "from ignorance
or gross neglect" causes or allows an explosion or other accident fatal
to any person, is guilty of manslaughter under a statute found in
Arkansas,"' Florida,"-' Massachusetts," Minnesota,"4 Nevada," New
York,w North Dakota," Oklahoma," South Dakota," and Wisconsin.'
In Wisconsin the statute also applies to railroad trains. In a similar
statute found in M'aine," the negligence requisite to the crime is "mis-
conduct or gross neglect"; in Tennessee"- it is "wilful negligence or
gross want of skill"; and in Washington 3 it is "ignorance, recklessness,
or gross negligence."
Any person having charge of a steam engine, boiler, or other
apparatus, who "from ignorance or gross neglect'" causes an explosion
resulting in the loss of human life, is guilty of manslaughter under
6 3Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) § 7146.
0 Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 21-415.
' Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 10081.
0 Miss. Code (1930) § 992.
,3 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) § 3992.
11 S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4025.
0 Wash. Code (Pierce, 1929) § 9004.
'Ark. Dig. Stat. (1921) § 2362.
' Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) § 7147.
11 Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 21-416.
7.1 Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 10082.
l1Miss. Code (1930) § 999.
14 Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 10088.
SN. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1052.
',N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 9493.
1O kla. Stat. (1931) § 2230.
4 S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4026.
11 Wash. Code (Pierce, 1929) § 9005.
-Wis. Stat. (1933) § 340.21.
,'Ark. Dig. Stat. (1921) § 2363.
" Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) § 7148.
''lMass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 265, § 30.
"Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 10083.
SNev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 10090.
"N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1052.
- N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 9494.
-Okla. Stat. (1931) § 2231.
,S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4027.
"'Wis. Stat. (1933) § 340.22.
"Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 129, § 6.
91 Tenn. Code (1932) § 10810.
"Wash. Code (Pierce, 1929) § 9006.
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the terms of a statute existing in Montana," New York," North
Dakota," Oklahoma,91 South Dakota,' 8 and Utah."
A Minnesota statute"' provides that
"Every person who by any act of negligence or misconduct in
business or employment in which he is engaged, or in the use or
management of any machinery, animals, or property of any kind
entrusted to his care or under his control, or by any unlawful,
negligent, or reckless act not specified by or coming within the
provisions of any other statute, occasions the death of any human
being, is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree."
In New York"' a statute of somewhat more limited scope pro-
vides that whoever makes negligent or reckless use of machinery,
resulting in the death of any person, is guilty of second degree man-
slaughter.
And killing another with a gun or other firearm, from careless-
ness in mistaking him for a deer or other animal while hunting, is in
Minnesota"' first degree manslaughter.
There are other statutory forms of negligent homicide which are
classified neither as murder nor as manslaughter. The broadest of
these statutes is that found in Texas: -
"Whoever in the performance of a lawful act shall by negli-
gence and carelessness cause the death of another is guilty of
negligent homicide of the first degree. A lawful act is one not
forbidden by the penal law and one which would give no just
occasion for a civil action... To constitute this offense there
must be an apparent danger of causing the death of the person
killed or some other... The want of proper care and caution
distinguishes this offense from excusable homicide. The degree
of care and caution is such as a man of ordinary prudence would
use under like circumstances. . . To bring the offense within the
definition of negligent homicide either of the first or the second
degree, there must be no apparent intention to kill."
These general provisions apply also to "the offense of negligent homi-
cide of the second degree, or such as is committed in the prosecution
of an unlawful act" not amounting to a felony.
Statutes of a more restricted type exist in other jurisdictions.
Several of these deal with homicide resulting from the negligent opera-
tion of railroad trains. An Arizona statute"' declares that
"Every person having charge, wholly or in part, of any railroad
car, locomotive, or train, who wilfully or negligently suffers or
"Mont. Rev. Code (1921) § 11229.
"N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1052.
9N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 9495.
" Okla. Stat. (1931) § 2232.
Is S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4028.
0Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) § 103-52-3.
"Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 10080.
"N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1052.
102 Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923) § 10075.
103 Tex. Penal Code (1925) arts. 1231-1238.
"0'Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) § 4692.
STUDENT NOTES
causes the same to collide with another car, locomotive, or train,
or with any other object or thing, whereby the death of any
human being is produced, is guilty of a felony."
The same statute exists also in Montana."' Homicide resulting from
a negligent railroad collision is a felony in Utah."' By law of Ten-
nessee17 "wrongful act, gross negligence, or omission" in the opera-
tion of railroad trains, resulting in the death of any person, is a fel-
ony; and in Connecticut "gross or wilful misconduct or negligence" on
the part of any employee of a railroad or electric railway company, re-
sulting in loss of life, has been made a felony by statute.' s
Several other statutes of this type are concerned with homicide
resulting from the negligent operation of motor vehicles. In Louisiana
such a statute'"O provides that
"Any person who by operation or use of any vehicle in a
grossly negligent or grossly reckless manner, but not wilfully or
wantonly, causes death of another person, shall be guilty of the
crime of involuntary homicide. .."
This act does not repeal the existing law of manslaughter, but a
charge of involuntary homicide is to be deemed to be included in every
indictment for manslaughter, where the death results from the negli-
gent operation of any vehicle."'
A similar statute in Michigan"' enacts that
"Every person who, by operation of any vehicle at an im-
moderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or negligent
manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of an-
other, shall be guilty of the crime of negligent homicide. .."
In Michigan, as in Louisiana, a charge of this offense is deemed to be
included in every charge of manslaughter.,'
By a New Hampshire enactment1
3
" ..If the death of any person results from the reckless
operation of a motor vehicle the person convicted of such reckless
operation shall, in lieu of any other penalty imposed by this sec-
tion, be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both, provided that the provisions of
this statute shall not be construed to limit or restrict prosecution
for manslaughter."
And a Wyoming statute provides14 that any person operating a
motor vehicle at a speed "greater than is reasonable and proper" who
" 5 Mont. Rev. Code (1921) § 11230.
",Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) § 103-46-27.
""Tenn. Code (1932) § 10815.
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 6047.
''La. Crim. Code (1932) § 1047.
"aI. § 1049.
" Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 16743.
"'Id. § 16744.
"'N. H. Laws (1931) c. 81.
""Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931) § 72-208.
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"shall, by result of so doing, seriously maim, injure or disfigure any
person or persons, or cause the death of any person, or persons...
shall be guilty of a felony."
Statutes have been enacted in several jurisdictions, denouncing
negligent offenses against the person not amounting to homicide. In
Maine5 "negligently or carelessly" shooting and wounding any human
being is a criminal offense. In Vermont'" "carelessly or negligently"
wounding another by gun shot is a felony. By a West Virginia statute,
"carelessly or negligently" shooting or wounding a human being or
any live stock while hunting is a misdemeanor
1 1
A Georgia statuten 8 provides that
"If any person employed in any capacity by any railroad company
doing business in this state, in course of such employment shall
be guilty of negligence, either by omission of duty, or by any act
of commission in relation to matters entrusted to him, or about
which he is employed, from which negligence serious bodily in-
jury, but not death, occurs to another, he shall be guilty of crim-
inal negligence, and shall be punished by confinement in the peni-
tentiary. .. "
In Pennsylvania' "gross negligence or wilful misconduct" by any
person in charge of a vehicle or vessel employed in the conveyance of
passengers, resulting in injury, is a criminal offense. In South Caro-
lina" if a railroad employee is negligent or careless, and any person
is injured thereby, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. And in Tennessee
"wrongful act, gross negligence, or omission" in the operation of any
railroad train, resulting in the wounding or crippling of any person,
is a misdemeanor. South Carolina has a statute' providing that "un-
skillfulness, mismanagement, or negligence" in the operation of any
steamboat, resulting in injury to any person, shall be a misdemeanor.
By a statute found in Florida "whoever, through culpable negli-
gence or reckless disregard for the safety of others, inflicts any per-
sonal injury or injuries upon another, not resulting in death, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the county jail..." A Kansas statute
provides that 4
"If any person be maimed, wounded, or disfigured, or receive
great bodily harm, or his life be endangered by the act, procure-
ment or culpable negligence of another, in cases and under cir-
cumstances which would constitute murder or manslaughter if
death had ensued, the person by whose act, procurement or negli-
"Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 129, §2.
U Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 8414.
",W. Va. Code (1931) c. 61, art. 7, § 11.
u Ga. Ann. Code (Park, 1914) Vol. VI, § 117.
" Pa. Stat. (1920) §7850.
'-S. C. Code (1932) § 1689.
Tenn. Code (1932) § 10814.
"'S. C. Code (1932) § 1126.
'21 Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) § 7164.
124 Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) § 21-435.
STUDENT NOTES
gence such injury shall be occasioned, shall in cases not otherwise
provided for, be punished by confinement at hard labor not ex-
ceeding five years..."
Several states have statutes directed against negligent offenses
against property. A Wyoming statute' declares that
"Any person who shall take into his possession, or hire or
loan any property of any . . . person or corporation, and shall,
while the same is in his custody, wilfully, or with gross neglect, or
with carelessness that is culpable or wrongful in its nature, dam-
age or destroy any such property . .. shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor. .."
In Vermont it is a misdemeanor carelessly to injure public property,2
and another Vermont statuteLn provides for the punishment of those
who negligently injure public shade trees. In Oklahoma'2 the wanton
or negligent injury of railroad property is a criminal offense.
There are numerous statutes regarding negligent offenses against
the public safety. Negligently setting forest or prairie fires is pun-
Ished by statute in Alabama,'0 Colorado,"' Idaho,"3' Michigan,"'2 Mon-
tana,"- Nebraska, 1 Nevada,"' New Hampshire,"' New Mexico,"' New
York,' North Carolina,'" North Dakota,'4 Ohio,'. Oregon,"' South
Carolina,"' South Dakota,'" Utah,"' Virginia,"" Washington,"' and West
Virginia.11-3
"Ignorance or gross neglect" in the operation of any steamboat,
resulting in an explosion or other accident endangering human life,
Is made criminal by statutes found in New York,' 0 North Dakota,"'
]ZWyo. Rev. Stat. (1931) § 32-375.
"''Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 8525.
" Id., § 3536.
"'Okla. Stat. (1931) § 2325.
"'Ala. Code (1923) §§4112-4113.
"'Colo. Ann. Stat. (Mills, 1927) § 2011.
"'Idaho Code (1932) § 17-2722.
"'ich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 16942.
"'Mont. Rev. Codes (1921) § 1150L
I"Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) § 28-509.
' Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 10262.
l N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 391, § 5.
N. Al. Stat. (1929) § 35-1406.
" N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1900.
"'N. C. Code (1927) § 4310.
1 N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 9775.
"I Ohio Ann. Code (1934) § 12436.
12 Ore. Code (1930) § 14-363.
'S. C. Code (1932) § 1208.
"I S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 3983.
147 Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) § 103-22-1.
'Va. Code (1930) § 4435.
"'Wash. Code (Pierce, 1929) § 8844.
"SW. Va. Code (1931) c. 61, art. 3, § 9.
" N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1892.
]N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 9708.
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Oregon,' South Dakota,1 Utah,'3 and Washington.51 A Missouri
statute' provides that
"If any master, owner, engineer, or pilot of any steamboat,
or engineer, conductor, superintendent or manager of any railroad
train or locomotive engine . . . shall wilfully or negligently run
or operate any such engine, boat or train of cars so as to en-
danger the life of any person, he shall, upon conviction, be fined in
any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars; and if any accident
happen by reason thereof, by which any person is killed, the per-
son so offending shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter."
"Ignorance or gross neglect" in the operation of a steam boiler or
other apparatus, resulting in an accident endangering human life, is
a criminal offense in Montana,'1 Nevada,' New York, z North Da-
kota,"' South Dakota,'0 and Utah.16
The negligent overloading of any passenger vessel, endangering
human life, is punished by statute in New York, 16 North Dakota,'3 and
South Dakota. T1 1 Alabamal has made a misdemeanor the "negligence,
carelessness, or want of proper skill" of any railway engineer causing
the derailment of a train, endangering human life. "Gross careless-
ness or neglect" in the management or control of any common carrier
is punishable in Illinois"m and South Carolina; ' and Florida has en-
acted that
"Whoever having management or control of or over any rail-
road train, steamboat, or other public conveyance used for com-
mon carriage of passengers, is guilty of gross carelessness or neg-
lect in or in relation to the conduct, management, and control of
such conveyance."
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
The reckless handling of firearms on passenger trains is prohib-
ited in Alabama,"' and carelessly discharging a firearm in a public
place or a business house is a misdemeanor in Arizona.1 " One state,
"'Ore. Code (1930) §14-236.
152S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4126.
"'Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) § 103-52-1.
"'Wash. Code (Pierce, 1929) § 9904.
"'Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) § 3996.
"6Mont. Rev. Codes (1921) § 11195.
1 Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 10270.
"5N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1893.
MIN. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 9709.
"0 S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4127.
16 Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) § 103-52-2.
"ON. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1890.
ON. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 9707.
"IS. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4126.
"0Ala. Code (1923) § 5334.
1Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935) c. 38, § 128.
"'S. C. Code (1932) § 1690.
"'Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) § 7759.
"'Ala. Code (1923) § 5362.
11'Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) § 4723.
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Oklahoma, has a statutem providing that an apothecary who "wilfully,
negligently, or ignorantly" mislabels drugs or incorrectly fills prescrip-
tions, endangering human life or health, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Statutes prohibiting the negligent operation of motor vehicles are
the most numerous variety of the class of statutes dealing with negli-
gent offenses against the public safety. In New York"1 2 "Every person
operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway shall drive such
vehicle in a careful and prudent manner . . ."; and the same provision
Is found in lontana,1"3 and in Missouri," where the driver must also
exercise "the highest degree of care." In Oregon'" and South Dakota'"
the motorist must maintain a "careful and prudent speed", and in
Kentucky'" must drive "in a careful manner." In Utah,"78 a "reason-
able and prudent" speed must be maintained; and in Nebraska,' New
Hampshire,"' Ohio,"' South Carolina," and Wyoming"' a "reasonable
and proper" speed. In Ohio the driver of a motor vehicle must also
exercise "due regard for the rights and safety of others.""'
One may not drive "recklessly" in Alabama,"' Maine,"' New Hamp-
shire,16 ' or Virginia;1" nor "in a reckless manner" in Nevada"' or
Washington.P" It is a misdemeanor in Pennsylvania, ' Rhode Isl-
and," and North Carolina,"'9 to operate a motor vehicle "recklessly or
at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper." In Ver-
mont it is a criminal offense to drive in a "careless or negligent man-
ner."1" In Tennessee," New Mexico," and Wisconsin,'"
"Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway care-
lessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of the rights
0kla. Stat. (1931) § 2438.
"'N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 64-a, § 56.
"'Mont. Rev. Codes (1921) § 1742.
17'1 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) § 7775.
1"'Ore. Code (1930) § 55-1007.
27 S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) § 8638-F.
" Ky. Stat. (1922) § 2739g-35.
2' Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) § 57-7-16.
"T'Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) § 39-1102.
21N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 103, § 17.
"' Ohio Ann. Code (1934) § 12603.
2S. C. Code (1932) § 1628.
"Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931) § 72-203.
'"Ohio Ann. Code (1934) § 12603-1.
'5Ala. Code (1923) § 3328.
" Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 29, § 86.
1'N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 102, § 11.
""Va. Code (1930) § 2145.
'Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4350.
"'Wash. Code (Pierce, 1929) § 196-4&
"'Pa. Stat. (1920) § 982.
"'1R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) § 1442.
"'N. C. Code (1927) § 2618.
"Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 5149.
"Tenn. Code (1932) § 2681.
"'N.M . Stat. (1929) § 11-803
"'Wis. Stat. (1933) § 85.40
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or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection
and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to
endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of reckless
driving..."
The remaining class of negligent crimes-negligent offenses
against public justice-includes one type of statute only. This statute
makes it a criminal offense for any officer legally In charge of pris-
oners convicted or accused of crime, negligently to allow any such
prisoner to escape. This statute, with slight and immaterial varia-
tions, is found in Alabama, 8 Florida,'" Indiana,2 Kentucky,"' Maine,' 2
New Hampshire,- ' North Carolina," Oklahoma,"' Oregon,"' Pennsyl-
vania,2" Rhode Island,-" Vermont,'- Virginia,"' West Virginia,2u and
Wisconsin."'
Although it is not strictly within the scope of this paper, it is in-
teresting to compare with the American statutes a Canadian enact-
ment which does not fall within any of the classes enumerated above.
The statute" provides that
"Everyone who has in his charge or under his control any-
thing whatever, whether animate or inanimate, or who erects,
makes or maintains anything whatever which, in the absence of
precaution or care, may endanger human life, is under a legal
duty to take reasonable precautions against, and use reasonable
care to avoid, such danger, and is criminally responsible for the
consequences of omitting, without lawful excuse, to perform such
duty."
It will be observed that these provisions are somewhat broader than
those of any of the statutes heretofore considered. This statute has
been construed by the Canadian courts to embody the ordinary tort
standard of "ordinary care." In The King v. McCarhyz" the Sas-
katchewan Court of Appeals upheld an instruction that if defendant
was not driving his automobile with "the care that an ordinary rea-
sonably prudent man would exercise," he would be guilty of man-
slaughter for the resulting death of another. On appeal, the judgment
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada.15
"'Ala. Code (1923) § 4007.
'Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) § 7536.
""Ind. Stat. (1933) § 10-1806.
"1Ky. Stat. (1922) § 1339.
')-Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 132, § 15.
m'N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 394, §15.
"'N. C. Code (1927) § 4405.
"Okla. Stat. (1931) § 2480.
2"Ore. Code (1930) § 14-422.
"'Pa. Stat. (1920) § 7839.
'"6R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) § 5998.
"Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 8672.
"'Va. Code (1930) § 4506.
21W. Va. Code (1931) c. 61, art. 5, § 9.
"'Wis. Stat. (1933) § 346.36.
21 Can. Rev. Stat. (1927) c. 36, § 247.
214 57 Dom. L. R. 93 (1921).
z5McCarthy v. The King, 59 Dom. L. R. 206 (1921).
STUDENT NOTES
What negligent acts should be made criminal offenses by statute is,
of course, a matter to be determined by the policy of each jurisdiction.
The writer submits, however, that in view of the disagreement which
prevails as to what constitutes criminal negligence, it would be ad-
visable in every state to follow the example set by some eight of the
American commonwealths in enacting a statutory definition of crim-
inal or culpable negligence.
It is submitted that such a statutory definition should follow
closely the tort standard of the want of the care which would be
exercised by a man of ordinary prudence, under the same or similar
circumastances. Aside from the mere precedent of an admittedly large
number of cases, which such a statute would sweep away, there seems
to be no good reason for requiring any higher degree of negligence in
the majority of negligent offenses. A crime is a wrongful act in-
juriously affecting the public; and since negligent acts, committed
without the exercise of ordinary care, are sufficiently wrongful to give
rise to a cause of civil action when they injuriously affect the indi-
vidual, it seems both logical and desirable that such acts, if they in-
juriously affect the public, should subject the offender to criminal
liability.
On the other hand, one may concede that in the case of offenses
of a highly serious nature, such as homicide, the mere want of ordi-
nary care ought not to subject the actor to as serious a penalty as
would be imposed in the case of an intentional offense or one com-
mitted through reckless and wanton misconduct. Fortunately, we are
dealing here with statutory offenses, and it is entirely possible to
make use of the well known statutory device of degrees of crime,
which many jurisdictions have adopted in their treatment of murder
and manslaughter. Negligent offenses, therefore, may be made of
lower degree than intentional offenses or reckless and wanton ones,
and the penalty in such cases may be lessened. It may be objected to
this that such a policy will increase the complexity of the criminal
law; but it should be remembered that the law is administered by
technicians whose business it is to become familiar with its subtleties.
So long as the utility of such legal devices in working substantial jus-
tice exceeds the disutility of manipulating them in practice, their in-
troduction into the law, by statute or otherwise, should be welcomed.
To summarize, the following types of statutes dealing with crim-
inal negligence are found in American jurisdictions:
(1) Statutes concerned with criminal negligence generally, found
In twelve states;
(2) Statutes on negligent homicide, found in thirty-four juris-
dictions;
(3) Statutes on negligent offenses against the person less than
homicide, found in nine states;
(4) Statutes on negligent offenses against property, occurring in
three states;
K. L. J.-7
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(5) Statutes concerning negligent offenses against the public
safety, found in thirty-three states;
(6) Statutes on negligent offenses against public justice, found
in fifteen states.
The following statutory provisions relative to criminal negligence
are recommended as desirable for general adoption:
(1) In every crime or public offense there must exist a union
or joint operation of act and intent, criminal negligence, or reckless
and wanton misconduct.Y8
(2) Reckless and wanton misconduct is the intentional doing of
an act, or failure to do an act which it is his duty to do, by one who
knows or has reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable
man to realize that his conduct involves a high degree of probability
that substantial harm will result therefrom5'T
(3) Criminal negligence is the want of the care which would be
exercised by a man of ordinary prudence under the same or similar
circumstances.
(4) Except in cases where it is otherwise provided by law, the
court in passing sentence upon one who has been convicted of a crime
or public offense shall take into consideration whether the criminal
act was committed intentionally, or through reckless and wanton
misconduct, or through ordinary criminal negligence, and shall adjust
the sentence accordingly.
JOSEPH S. FREELAND.
WILLS-REVOCATION BY DESTRUCTION.
Mary Nish left her will in the possession of W. S. McCaull, her
relative and attorney. Desiring to revoke a codicil of the will, she
wrote McCaull and told him to destroy the codicil, which he did by
tearing it into some thirty pieces, which he later reassembled and
pasted to a piece of paper, thus restoring the codicil to its original
legibility. The testatrix was advised of the destruction before her
death. In an action to probate the will and codicil as if there had
been no destruction, it was held that the codicil had been destroyed
by the tearing by McCaull. Thus, the Iowa court fairly and squarely
held that a testator might, by a written letter, not executed with the
formalities of a will, denote a third person his agent for the purpose
of destroying his will, and that the destructive act need not be com-
mitted in the presence of the testator, and yet that the statutory re-
quirements for revocation would be satisfied.
2160 . Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) § 4486, cited supra in note 11.
217 C. the Restatement of the Law of Torts (1934) § 500.
'Re Estate of Mary Nish, - Iowa - , 261 N. W. 521 (1936).
